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By L. RICHARD FREESE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of our American cities during the post-war years
has been achieved, to a great extent, by subdivision development
on the urban fringe. A typical subdivision is on an impressive scale,
with a minimum of fifty lots and a marked increase in the appur-
tenances of urbanization. Incident to this growth there has been
increased sensitivity by our public-minded citizens to the fact that
planned and regulated urban expansion would not only promote
the aesthetic pleasures of future city habitation but avoid the many
difficulties created by sporadic, unregulated expansion of former
years. Municipal control of urban development has moved beyond
mere zoning regulations and is now promoting orderly growth by
subtle, yet more penetrating, requirements imposed upon promoter-
subdividers as conditions for official approval of their plats and
the development and sale of their land.'
These newer post-war planning controls are denoted "com-
pulsory dedications." Such dedications will be the focus of this
article. For these purposes, compulsory dedications must be distin-
guished from zoning regulations. Typical zoning regulations deter-
mine whether the land is to be used for residential, industrial, or
trade purposes, or control the size of the proposed lots or of the
house footage, or establish the degree of set-back of a proposed
structure from the street.2 Compulsory dedications, by comparison,
typically involve the following relinquishments of the subdivided
land to public ownership:
a. Inner-subdivision streets: streets which primarily serve
the subdivision's inhabitants as access-ways to the city's
major arteries.
3
b. Major municipal streets: streets which primarily serve the
entire municipal populace, or at least a larger segment of
the entire populace than the inhabitants of the subdivision
itself.
4
c. Rights-of-way for inner-subdivision utilities: easements for
basic public utilities (water, sewer, electricity, telephone)
needed for the new inhabitants. 5
The author, an associate of the Denver firm of Lewis, Grant & Davis, is grateful for the advice
and assistance of Clyde 0. Martz, Esq., in the preparation of this article.
I Most planning ordinances provide that a subdivision plat shall not be "recorded" until the
conditions are met, thus implying that a subdivision may be completed regardless of such conditions
if the developer is willing to forego recordation. However, the promotional advantages, indeed the
necessities of recordation, make such inhibition an effective sanction. In many states, recordation
is the only lawful way to set up a new subdivision. See Carter, J., in dissent in Ayres v. City
Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
2 E.g., Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code §610-649 (1958).
3 See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supra note 1, where one of the dedications under
attack was a requirement that the subdivider relinquish eighty, rather than the proposed sixty feet
for a subdivision street which ran into a major city artery. 'ee also Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164,
106 N.E.2d 503 (Ct. of App. 1952), where access roads to the proposed lots were required.
4 See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supra note 1, involving a dedication of twenty
extra feet for future expansion of a major city thoroughfare. See also Krieger v. Planning Com-
mission of Howard County, 224 Md. 320, 167 A.2d 885 (1961), where petitioner resisted a required
dedication of fifty feet from the center of a "major street."
5 See footnote 6 infra.
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d. Rights-of-way for future expansion of public utility sys-
tems: easements for utilities which will provide not only
for the subdivision's inhabitants but for other neighboring
subdivisions.6
e. Inner-subdivision public spaces: portions of the subdivision
area deeded to the municipality for public recreational and
educational facilities, designed primarily to provide for the
needs of the new inhabitants.7
f. Community-wide public spaces: portions of the subdivision
area deeded to the municipality for general municipal re-
creational and educational enjoyment, beyond the needs of
the new inhabitants.
8
g. Cash in lieu of public facilities: required payment of funds
to a public fund in place of actual dedication of land to
public ownership.9
Since Village of Euclid v. Ambler,10 the first zoning case to
reach the United States Supreme Court, the typical zoning regula-
tions mentioned above have been considered acceptable modes of
municipal control over private land use. Under the police power
of each state, such zoning laws have been deemed consonant with
the "public health, safety and general welfare."" Zoning is typically
a restriction on use. It may well depreciate the value of one's prop-
erty, but does not open up that property to public use. It is difficult,
therefore, to envision the effect of such zoning regulations as an
unconstitutional "taking" of private property without just compen-
sation. Zoning laws have been deemed "unreasonable" only in the
instances in which they actually negative all practical use or under-
mine all actual value of the zoned land.'
2
It is less difficult to envision a "taking" for public use in trac-
ing the effects of compulsory dedications. In each of the six enum-
erated typical dedications above, the subdivider is actually required
to deed his property to the corporate public body. Unlike the zoning
laws, these compulsory dedications more directly highlight the con-
flict between the police power and the eminent domain provisions
6 In Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal.2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1958), the subdivider was required
to pay $99.07 per acre for a city "Subdivision Drainage Fund" as a condition for plot approval.
In Lake Intervale Homes v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28 (1958),
the subdivider was compelled to install such water mains, sewers, etc. "as may be required by
the governing body."
7 In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 111.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d
799 (1961), an ordinance required the dedication of land in each new subdivision to "public
grounds." In Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 111.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960), the city
ordinance required the subdivider to dedicate land to "facilitate the establishment of school
facilities convenient to any proposed subdivision . . . as may be deemed necessary by the Planning
Commission .... " In Miller v. City of Beaver Foils, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951), the statute
provided for reservation for future appropriation of four and one-half acres of the subdivider's
lnd, pursuant to a "general plan for parks." In Fortson In estment Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179
Okla. 473, 66 P.2d 96 (1937), the planning board required dedication of five per cent of each
subdivision before approval of submitted plot was given. In Kelber v. City of Upland, supra
note 6, $30 per lot was required to be contributed to a "Park and School Site Fund." See also In re
Lake Secor Development Co., 141 Misc. 918, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (1931), and Coronado Development
Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962).
8 See footnote 7 supra.
9 Kelber v. City of Upland, supra notes 6 and 7. In Coronado Development Co. v. City of
McPherson, supro note 7, an ordinance provided that if ten per cent of a subdivision was not
designated on the city master plan for pork dedication, then subdivider must pay ten per cent of
his land's value in lieu thereof.
10 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 Sup.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926).
11 See, e.g., Fischer v. Bedminister Tp., 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952) per Vanderbilt, J. See
also Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on the Urban Fringe,
1961 Wis. L. Rev. 370 (1961).
12 See e.g., Denver v. Denver Buick, 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959); Appeal of Medinger,
377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954); Ritenour v. Dearborn Tp., 326 Mich. 242, 40 N.W.2d 137 (1949).
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of our state and federal constitutions. Compulsory dedications, as
the zoning laws, find their constitutional justification in the state
police power.13 Unfortunately, there has been considerable con-
fusion in the courts over the divergent characteristics of compul-
sory dedications and of zoning laws and over their respective con-
stitutional bases.14 A semantical conflict has arisen over whether
the police power concept should be used to "promote" the public
needs, rather than simply "protect" it. 15 Some courts view the
police power as an expansive tool, fit to justify non-compensable
public action when the exigencies of the community overshadow
private speculation. Other courts argue that the police power must
not be allowed to become a doctrine of gargantuan statism, nega-
tiving any meaningful efficacy to the constitutional eminent domain
provisions. In short, it is presently unclear at what point noncom-
pensable compulsory dedications overflow into unconstitutional
confiscations for public use. The state judicial temper, no doubt,
has a great deal to do with the decisional result.16
A second constitutional problem is the due process concern
over improper delegations of legislative power. This is a general
administrative law problem. Its significance in this particular area
is as yet unexplored. 17 Generally, there must be enabling statutes
which provide for the planning regulations employed.18 Such sta-
tutes must set forth sufficient guidelines so that planning commis-
sion approval of subdivision plats will not be subject to ad hoc,
discriminatory conditions.19 Although as a matter of practice, the
planning authorities may be acting in a manner comporting with
"fair play," the standards for administrative control are often so
vague that subdividers may be subject to the arbitrary whims of
planning authority personnel. This is' less than due process. More-
over, it is not always clear that the scope of control is justified
under an appropriate enabling statute.
In general, any subdivision control program must be sustained
as a reasonable exercise of the police power and be circumscribed
by clear guidelines in the enabling legislation.
13 See Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supro note 1; Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v.
Village of Mount Prospect, supra note 7.
14 E.g., Krieger v. Planning Commission of Howard County, supra note 4; Newton v. American
Security Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941).
15 See Frantz, J., concurring in Denver v. Denver Buick, supro note 12 at 143.
16 See Cutler, supro note 11.
17 See Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by Municipal Planning Boards, 40 Cornell L.Q. 258 (1955).
18 Denver v. Denver Buick, supra note 12 at 131-38.
19 Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
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II. THE POLICE POWER AND EMINENT DOMAIN
Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles,2 was a landmark case
involving the constitutionality of compulsory dedications. The city
council imposed four conditions for plat approval upon the peti-
tioner-subdivider: (1) dedication of a ten-foot strip for future
widening of a major city thoroughfare running along the subdivi-
sion's boundary; (2) an additional dedication of ten feet adjoining
the major thoroughfare for trees and shrubs to prevent access from
the adjoining lots onto the busy highway; (3) dedication of the
eighty-foot street rather than the proposed sixty-foot street, to run
vertically into the major thoroughfare; and (4) dedication of an
isolated triangle strip to street use. In a sweeping, latitudinarian
opinion, the California Supreme Court upheld the "findings" of the
trial court whereby these four requirements were "reasonably
related to the protection of the public health, safety and general
welfare. '21 In answer to the petitioner's contention that his prop-
erty had been taken for public use without compensation, the court
reasoned that the dedication was "voluntary, at least in theory."
22
The Ayres majority suggests that it is irrelevant that the benefits
of the first requirement would primarily be received by the general
public, not the subdivision's inhabitants, for in its view the police
power justified the "promoting" of public goals.
The Ayres viewpoint has not been universally embraced. In-
deed, the Illinois and Pennsylvania courts have taken a much more
restrictive attitude. In Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village
of Mount Prospect,23 the Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that "the
developer may be required to assume those costs which are speci-
fically and uniquely attributable to his activity and which would
otherwise be cast upon the public," but "the subdivider should not
be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying" the community's
educational and recreational problems, for such "would amount to
an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensa-
tion. ' 2 In reconciling the conflict between eminent domain and the
20 Supro note 1.
21 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, supra note 1. Accord, Krieger v. Planning Commission of
Howard County, supro note 4; Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164. 106 N.E.2d 503 (Ct. of App., 1952). See
dicta in Caledonia v. Racine Limestone Co., 266 Wis. 475, 63 N.W.2d 697 at 699 (1954). See also,
Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 (1936); Newton v. American Security Co.,
supra note 14.
22 Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Col.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (1949). See also Ridgefield
Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928). Compare the dissent in Ayres
by Carter, J., which rejects this reasoning as pure sophistry. Carter, J., points out that in actuality,
regardless of "in theory," the advantages of plat recordation are so great as to make the sanction
of non-recordation an effective inhibition to resistance. Cf., MansfieId and Swett v. Town of
West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A.2d 225 (1938).
23 22 111.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
24 Id. at 801-02. See also the dicta in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 at
233-234 (Ill., 1960). Accord, Miller v. City of Beaver Falls, 368 Pa. 189, 82 A.2d 34 (1951). It is
interesting to note that the California Court seems to have shifted its position in Kelber v. City of
Upland, 155 Cal.2d 631, 318 P.2d 561 (1957), holding that "The purpose and intent of the Sub.
division Map Act [the California enabling act] is to provide for the regulation and control of the
design and improvement of a subdivision with a proper consideration of its relation to adjoining
areas, and not to provide funds for the benefit of an entire city .... . . In so holding, the
California court skirted the constitutional issue faced in the Ayres case but by this statutory
interpretation, the court has effectively narrowed the latitudian view of the Ayres majority. Of
course, the Kelber holding does not constitutionally forbid the California legislature from passing
an enabling act to provide for funds in lieu of actual dedications. Nevertheless, the majority's
langua e indicates a more restrictive view of the constituttional issues would now be taken by
the California Supreme Court. It is of interest that the three dissenters in Kelber were in the
majority in Ayres while the Kelber majority was made up of new members of the California
bench. In Fortson Investment Co. v. Oklahoma City, 179 Okla. 473, 66 P.2d 96 (1937), the Okla.
homa court did not pass upon the issue of whether a required dedication of five per cent of every
subdivision for public open spaces was a non-compensated taking for public use, holding that
the trial court had correctly found that the dedication was "voluntary;" the implication of the
court's languoge, however, is that a "compulsory" dedication would be forbidden. In re Lake
Secor Development Co., 141 Misc. 918, 252 N.Y.S. 809 (1931) could be squared with these cases.
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police power, these more conservative courts have enunciated the
general proposition that the scope of the permissible compulsory
dedication must be equitably related to the needs of the new com-
munity. 25 It is unreasonable to condition the use of private land
upon a toll for the general community benefit. It is submitted that
the Colorado Supreme Court would be receptive to this general
proposition. In the recent Denver Buick case,26 the court discussed
the scope of the state police power in holding that a zoning ordi-
nance requiring off-street parking upon petitioners' property was
an unconstitutional confiscation for public ends:
The legal effect of the argument of the City is that it
has a problem of concentration of traffic in the street and
that accordingly there is a right, under the zoning ordi-
nance, to appropriate for off-street parking substantial por-
tions of property of citizens desiring to use that property
for a legitimate purpose .... No such power exists in the
City thus to take private property for a public purpose
without compensation to the owner for the taking.
27
Not only does the Denver Buick language reflect a watchful soli-
citude for the efficacy of the eminent domain provisions, there is
indeed little difference between this off-street parking zoning law
and many compulsory dedication requirements, such as b, d, and f,
enumerated above.
Assuming that the Pioneer Trust proposition would be adopted
by the Colorado Supreme Court in judging the constitutionality of
the compulsory dedications imposed by our various Colorado muni-
cipal planning bodies, the following decisional results would be
reached with regard to the six typical dedications enumerated:
a. Inner-subdivision streets: being related primarily to the
subdivision's needs, such dedications should not be envi-
sioned as "takings" for public use, for the purport of the
requirement is private.
2 8
b. Major municipal streets: such dedications must be compen-
sated unless the municipality can show that the new in-
habitants will appreciably increase the artery's traffic, in
which case the subdeveloper should donate an appropriate
portion to compensate for the additional burden upon the
public fisc.
29
c. Inner-subdivision utilities' easements: these would be up-
held under the same logic as in "a".
30
d. Utility easements for future community expansion: unless
the developer is compensated for a pro rata portion of such
dedications designed to provide for other than his subdivi-
25 See especially Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, supro note 23.
26 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959).
27 Id. at 131.
28 E.g., Regulations of the Denver Planning Office, as adopted on September 26, 1956 [hereafter
called "1956 Reg.'s"], Sec. V, C, (4) (dealing with alignment of subdivision streets with other
existing streets), (9)-(10) (dealing with width of streets). Compare proposed Regulations of the
Denver Planning Office [hereinafter called "1962 Reg.'s"], Section B, 2, (a). Regulations of Arvada
Planning Commission (non-home rule city), as adopted on April 16, 1962 [hereinafter called "Arvoda
Reg.'s"], Section 5, C, (1), (2), (a), (b) and (d).
29 E.g., "1956 Reg.'s" Sec. V, C, (1) (9) (10) (dealing with primary streets of one hundred feet
width). Compare "1962 Reg.'s" Sec. B, 2, (c). "Arvada Reg.'s," Section 5, C, (2) (c).
30 E.g., "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, C, (8), providing for easements for storm sewers, sanitary sewers
and water mains to serve the new inhabitants. Compare "1962 Reg.'s," Sec. B, 2, (f). "Arvoda
Reg.'s," Section 5, E, (1) and (3).
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sion's inhabitants, such would be an unconstitutional con-
fiscation.
3
e. Inner-subdivision public spaces: again, these would be up-
held under the "a" logic.
3 2
f. Community-wide public spaces: again, a formula reflecting
the recreational needs of the new inhabitants and of the
entire community must be achieved, the subdivider being
compensated for that portion given primarily for use of the
entire municipality.
33
g. Cash in lieu of public facilities: if the payment required
was equitably in substitute for the dedication not so re-
quired, and such payment were related to the subdivision's
activities, it should be upheld. However, the courts seem
reluctant to take this step. In Kelber v. City of Upland
(California) 34 and Coronado Development Co. v. City of
McPherson (Kansas), 35 the courts held that the enabling
statute did not provide for cash in place of actual dedica-
tion. No cases, however, have squarely faced the constitu-
tional issue.
III. THE DUE PROCESS DELEGATION PROBLEM
Dedication requirements must be authorized by appropriate
enabling legislation.36 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-59-2 (1953) provides
for the creation of. city planning commissions. Colo. Rev. Stat.
§139-59-6 (1953) empowers these planning commissions to make a
master plan for their cities, locating streets, parks, public utilities,
etc. This enabling act is sufficiently broad to authorize the com-
pulsory dedications delineated above.37 However, this act "applies
to home rule charter cities [only] so far as constitutionally per-
31 E.g., "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, C, (8), providing for easements for "the extension of main sewers
and similar utilities." Compare "1962 Reg.'s," Sec. B, 2, (f). Note also "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, C,
(6), requiring the dedication of easements along all streams "for drainage, parkway or recreational
use." "Arvada Reg.'s," Section 5, E, (1), and Section 5, G.
32 E.g.. "1956 Reg.'s," Sec. V, B, requiring dedication for public open spaces "a reasonable size
for neighborhood playground, park and public uses." "Arvd Re .'s," Section 5, H.33 E.g., "1962 Reg.'s," Sec. B, 2, (e), providing that "Areas designated on the Comprehensive
Plan as parks, playgrounds, schools or other public uses should be dedicated or an option to
purchase given to the City for a period of 5 years."
34 155 Cal.2d 631, 318 P.2d 661 (1958).
35 189 Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962).
36 Denver v. Denver Buick, supra note 12; Kelber v. City of Upland, supra note 24; Coronado
Development Co. v. City of McPherson, supra note 35; Beach v. Zoning Commission of the Town of
Milford, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814, 817 (1954).
37 See, e.g., Arvada Ordinance No. 333, Nov. 25, 1957.
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missible and so far as limits placed upon its application within the
boundaries of home rule charter cities by the charter of each home
rule charter city individually. '38 Article XX of the Colorado Con-
stitution states that "The statutes of the state of Colorado, so far as
applicable, shall continue to apply to such [home rule] cities and
towns, except in so far as superseded by the charters . . . or by
ordinances passed pursuant to such charters."3
9
Section 651 of the Denver Ordinances provides for a "Subdivi-
sion Control Ordinance" whereby the Denver City Council must
approve or disapprove of each subdivision plat before it can be
recorded. The submitted plat is to be reviewed and approved by
various city departments, such as the Department of Public Works,
and a city Planning Office is authorized to set up regulations and
rules for its recommendations to the city council regarding the
propriety of the proposed subdivision. Basically, plat approval in
Denver consists of action by the Denver City Council, under rec-
ommendations from its Planning Office and other city departments.
The enabling legislation for Denver's "Subdivision Control
Ordinance," pursuant to Article XX of the Colorado Constitution,
must be found in the Denver Charter. If the Charter does not au-
thorize the ordinance, the state statutes must provide enablement.
The Denver Charter does not specifically authorize plat approvals
by the city council. However, Chapter B, Article I, Section B 1.12-1,
of the Denver Charter, provides that "The council shall have power
to enact and provide for the enforcement of all ordinances to pro-
tect life, health and property; . . . and to preserve and enforce good
government, general welfare, order and security . . . ." Moreover,
the "Zoning" provisions of the Denver Charter may provide suffi-
cient authorization. Chapter B, Article I, Section B 1.13, grants the
city council power "to regulate and restrict the height, number of
stories and size of buildings .... the size of yards, courts and other
open spaces . . . and the location and use of buildings, structures
and land for trade, industry, residence and other purposes." This"zoning" provision, however, points to typical zoning regulations,
not to compulsory dedications as such. Authorization might be
sought in Chapter A, Article II, setting up the Department of Public
Works. Section A 2.3-1 of that article provides that "no rights-of-
way for streets . . . or other thoroughfares shall be established . . .
and no site for any public purpose shall be accepted until first ap-
proved by ordinance." However, in its plat-by-plat approval of sub-
division plats pursuant to the "Subdivision Control Ordinance,"
the city council is acting more as an administrative body than as
a legislative body "by ordinance."
The inquiry as to whether a Denver ordinance has specific
authorization under the Denver Charter is brought forth because of
language found in the Denver v. Denver Buick case.40 There, the
Colorado Supreme Court held that the Denver Charter did not
provide for certain zoning ordinances, thus, such ordinances could
not be legally sustained. Therefore, the court viewed the Denver
home rule Charter as a grant of power to the city council, rather
3M Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59-1 (1953).
39 Colo. Const. art. XX, 16 (h).
40 141 Colo. 121, at 133-138 (1959).
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than a limitation upon the council's hegemony over local and muni-
cipal affairs. Of course, to the extent that a home rule ordinance
is not enabled by the home rule charter, the Colorado Constitution,
Article XX, allows the state statutes to apply. There may be dif-
ficulty, however, in squaring such planning ordinances with either
the city charter or the state statutes. Such is the case wi th the
Denver "Subdivision Control Ordinance." If Denver's Ordinance
does not find authorization under the Charter, it also does not set
up a special planning commission with the powers and duties as
set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59 et seq. Pursuant to the Denver
Ordinance, the City's Planning Office has only recommendatory
powers.
An equally significant problem arises from the due process
requirement that administrative bodies shall act pursuant to suffi-
ciently discernible guidelines, set forth in the legislative enabling
act.41 The standards set forth in the Denver "Subdivision Control
Ordinance" are both sweeping and vague. The ordinance provides
that subdivisions should be "regulated and restricted in order to
insure an orderly growth and development of the City and County
of Denver.42 The City Council shall impose "any reasonable con-
ditions" to achieve that end. 43 In Prouty v. Heron, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that: "Without standards fixed by the law
[setting forth distinctions between various listing types of engineer-
ing, of which an applicant could be registered to practice only in
the type for which he qualified], the discretion to declare what the
law is, is delegated to the board [State Board of Engineer Exa-
miners]. This cannot legally be done."' 4 It is arguable that the Den-
ver control ordinance does not meet this due process qualification.
However, the non-home rule city enabling statutes, especially Colo.
Rev. Stat. §139-59-14 (1953), are less susceptible to due process
criticism. Not only are the policy goals set out more specifically in
those sections than in the Denver control ordinance, no subdivision
control can be undertaken until the commission adopts a compre-
hensive plan and sets up official regulations.45 The Denver "Com-
prehensive Plan" was repealed as an ordinance, formerly Section
660 of the Denver Ordinances, in 1958.46 The control ordinance does
not bind the city council's approval of plats to any of the regula-
tions set up by its own Planning Office, whose approval or dis-
approval of a submitted plat is purely recommendatory. 47 Thus,
any unconstitutional vagueness of the Denver control ordinance
would not be clarified under those cases which hold that a lack of
sufficient guidelines is cured by the adoption of binding adminis-
trative regulations, either formally or by administrative practice. 48
41 Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953); Smith v. City of Brookfield, 272 Wis. 1,
74 N.W.2d 770 (1956); Caledonia v. Racine Limestone Co., 266 Wis. 475, 63 N.W.2d 97 (1954); Lake
Intervale Homes v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 28 N.J. 423, 147 A.2d 28, 38.40 (1958);
Mansfield and Swett v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 198 A.2d 225 (1938).
42 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code 0651.1 (1958).
43 Id. at §651.9.
44 127 Colo. 168 at 176. See Lake Intervole, supra note 40. Beach v. Zoning Commission of
Town of Milford, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814, 817 (1954); Borough of Oakland v. Roth, 28 N.J.
Super. 321, 100 A.2d 698, 701.2 (1953).
45 Colo. Rev. Stat. §139-59-14 (1953).
46 Repealed by Sec. 2 (d), Ordinance 218, Series 1958.
47 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Code §651.9-.10 (1958). See the introduction to The Low and
Rules in the proposed 1962 Planning Office Regulations.




Urban planning should be encouraged. Its benefits are many,
both now and in the future. In achieving our public goals, we must
take note of the paths which our constitutional framework requires
us to take. As has been discussed, the law is not settled as to the
rights and obligations of the public planning bodies in this area
of subdivision dedications. This article has attempted to prognosti-
cate the direction in which Colorado law will move with respect
to this important matter.
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